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Laboratory”
Ron A. M. Fouchier
Department of Viroscience, Erasmus MC, Rotterdam, the Netherlands
In a letter to the editor (1), Dr. Lynn C. Klotz challenges myconclusion (2) that laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) are
expected to occur at an extremely low frequency in facilities such
as those used at ErasmusMC for studies on airborne transmission
of influenza viruses between ferrets and that these studies pose
negligible risks to humans and the environment. Unfortunately,
Dr. Klotz does not provide a scientific justification of how the
numbers should be adjusted based on the biosafety measures that
are in place in these facilities, which is the key challenge in this
debate. Dr. Klotz suggests that incidents at the U.S. CDC labora-
tories and the long history of escape of LAI agents and other es-
capes from laboratories show that my estimates of the likelihood
of LAIs occurring at the Erasmus MC facility are too low. How-
ever, it is unclear tome how the incidents at theU.S. CDC—which
did not lead to LAIs—would affect my calculations. In addition, I
have pointed out previously that historical data on LAIs do not
take into account the specific pathogen types or the numerous
biosafety measures that are in place to mitigate the risks in labo-
ratories where transmission research is conducted (2).
Dr. Klotz proposes to multiply the low likelihood of LAIs by
300, based on an estimated 30 laboratories involved in the “whole
research enterprise” for 10 years, and assumes that part of this
research enterprise may lack the rigorous safety practices in place
at Erasmus MC. Both assumptions are wrong, to the best of my
knowledge; just over a handful of laboratories have worked on
airborne transmission of avian influenza viruses, each of which
has rigorous safety practices in place (3-7).
Another key aspect is that Dr. Klotz estimates the likelihood of
onward transmission from a case of LAI as 0.1 (10%), in contrast
to my justification for an adjusted likelihood of1 10–5, based
on the specific conditions under which the research is performed,
without providing a rationale for that important deviation (2).
Finally, Dr. Klotz describes the (apocalyptic) scenario of an influ-
enzapandemicwith140million fatalitiesbasedona10%case-fatality
rate in20%of theworld’spopulation.Thesenumbersnotonly ignore
the scientifically justifiable counterarguments raised before (2) but
also are at odds with the documented influenza pandemics of the
past. Inmy view, the “gain-of-function” debate has suffered from the
apocalyptic scenarios that are provided as factual whereas they pro-
vide estimates that are far beyond the observed worst cases (8). In
calculations of the probability of a community LAI (“E”), Dr. Klotz
further assumes that transmission studies in the ErasmusMC facility
will be performed for a period (“y”) of 1 million years. I am hopeful
that our research enterprise will have reached solid conclusions on
determinants of airborne transmission a bit sooner.
With the caveats listed above, I agree with Dr. Klotz in refer-
ence to another mBio publication (9) that provides some argu-
ments as to whymy calculations of the probability of LAIs may be
too low. Taking into account the conditions of work at Erasmus
MC (2), there are three arguments that are valid in that publica-
tion. First, I assumed that the enhanced biosafety measures at
Erasmus MC would yield a decrease in the probability of LAIs by
at least a factor of 10 compared to “ordinary” BSL3 laboratories
through the physical separation of personnel from the viruseswith
which they work, the use of class 3 isolator units and class 3 bio-
safety cabinets, the use of personal protective equipment, the ex-
tensive training program, the use of experienced personnel only,
and the application of a two-person rule to reduce human error
during animal experiments. This is an explicit assumption, and
the factor of 10 requires further analysis, as others and I have
pointed out (2, 9, 10). Second, Dr. Lipsitch and Dr. Inglesby are
correct in stating that vaccines are not readily available for trans-
mission studies with some avian influenza viruses (e.g., subtype
H7), thus increasing the risks of potential LAIs and onward trans-
mission in such cases, albeit modestly. Third, biosafety measures
cannot prevent malicious removal of viruses from the lab and
intentional release into the environment. On this latter point it is
important to note that numerous security measures are also in
place in facilities like ours, but those cannot be disclosed in detail
for obvious reasons. However, our facility has been secured by
procedures recognized as appropriate through in-depth audits by
the institutional biosafety officers and facility management at
Erasmus MC as well as national and international (U.S.) govern-
ment inspectors. It is also important to note that these and many
of the other biosafety and biosecurity arguments that continue to
be raised against so-called “gain-of-function” research apply
equally to natural pathogens, and—in my opinion—are not valid
arguments to shut down or restrict a specific line of virus research.
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